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Control Room and the Staging of War
Barry Mauer
The description of a war can be a weapon of war.1
1 Jehane Noujaim’s  documentary,  Control  Room (2004),  focuses on the Al  Jazeera news
channel  in the early days of  the Iraq War.  Control  Room answers Donald Rumsfeld’s
charge  that  Al  Jazeera  sides  with  terrorists;  Control  Room  shows  Al  Jazeera’s  staff
faithfully translating the pronouncements of Bush administration figures, striving for
balance, and putting themselves at great risk to get the stories that western journalists
were not covering. In the film’s darkest sequence, we learn that Tarek Ayyoub, an Al
Jazeera  reporter,  died  from  an  American  bomb  attack  while  he  was  on  the  job  in
Baghdad, raising the question of whether the U.S. targeted Al Jazeera’s offices in order
to silence the station. Control Room was not filmed in Baghdad, however, but in Qatar,
the  location  of  U.S.  Central  Command (aka  CentCom)  and Al  Jazeera  headquarters.
Though the military conflict between the U.S.  and Iraq did not extend there,  Qatar
became a battlefield of representation as Al Jazeera and CentCom battled each other for
control over representation.
2 By focusing on the contested arena of media representation during the early days of
the Iraq War,  Noujaim’s Control  Room makes a vital  contribution to the debate over
media producers’ relationships to centers of political and military power in a time of
war. The film demonstrates that we need ways to navigate the flood of misinformation
and competing points of view that surround us. Like other documentaries that dealt
with media representations of the Iraq War,  such as Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit  911
(2004), Danny Schechter’s WMD: Weapons of Mass Deception (2004), Jeremy Earp and Sut
Jhally’s  Hijacking  Catastrophe:  9/11,  Fear  &  the  Selling  of  American  Empire  (2004),  John
Pilger’s The War You Don’t See (2010), and Robert Greenwald’s Uncovered: The War on Iraq
(2004), Control Room shows us symptoms of a damaged public sphere and a mass media
that fails to do its public duty. What distinguished Control Room from these films is its
cinéma vérité style; there is no narrator to provide an argument about the war. Rather,
Control Room relies on arguments made by its subjects and on the power of editing to
make its case.
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3 This essay analyzes Control Room in order to gauge the power of documentary to restore
the public sphere. What factors shape the making of news during times of war? How
can viewers learn to navigate the competing media frames and narratives about war?
How can dedicated documentarians make more democratic a public sphere that has
been badly damaged by corporate media consolidation and government propaganda?
Finally,  can  rhetoric  and  poetics  shed  light  on  the  choices  made  by  documentary
filmmakers during times of war and the ways in which target audiences are expected to
make sense of their films? 
4 Rhetoric and poetics, I argue, can help us understand the arena of public discourse,
supplementing political media analyses proposed in the works of Jean Baudrillard and
others.  Noujaim’s  film fosters  attention to  the kinds  of  pseudo-events  discussed by
Baudrillard. For example, the film shows uncritical American media outlets repeating
the packaged statements of military officials about the announced “rescue” of Private
Jessica Lynch.2 
5 Institutional  analyses,  such  as  the  entertaining  and  enlightening  work  of  Herbert
Schiller, examine the structures of media entities; who owns the media? How does it
“package  consciousness”?3 These  are  worthy  questions  and  Schiller  provides  an
excellent  critique  of  the  ways  in  which  corporate  control  of  the  media  has  stifled
dissent.  Schiller,  who  wrote  much  of  his  work  before  the  days  of  global
telecommunications,  was skeptical  of  the power of  independent media to challenge
corporate control because, he argued, it must still abide by the rules of profitability in a
capitalist  society.4 Nevertheless,  independent  media  has  grown in  recent  years  and
represented a significant challenge to the Bush administration. Also a challenge to the
Bush administration was foreign media, as evidenced by the efforts the administration
took to marginalize, discredit, or bomb these sources, especially Al Jazeera, during the
selling and prosecution of the war. To understand how independent and foreign media
present challenges to government and to media conglomerates in the U.S., I turn to
Douglas Kellner’s view that media is a contested arena that requires audiences to learn
critical tools in order to understand it.5 A textual analysis of Noujaim’s film reveals the
ways in which she seeks to educate the viewer to decipher the making and framing of
the news.
6 Bill Nichols puts Aristotelian rhetoric to good use in his discussion of the effects of
documentary.6 He  reminds  us  that  the  categories  of  proofs,  including  ethical,
emotional,  and demonstrative,  shape the documentarian’s filmmaking choices in an
attempt to persuade audiences of the filmmaker’s argument. By going “backstage” to
show how media managers stage war for mass consumption, Control Room stages the
media contest in a self-reflexive gesture. If we accompany our viewing of Control Room
with lessons about rhetoric and poetics—which aids in understanding the staging of
war as drama—we can become thoughtful media critics and engage effectively in the
process of making the public sphere more democratic. 
7 Control Room shows us journalists and political players engaged in staging our images of
war.  To  stage  a  war  is  to  arrange  the  combatants  before  the  battlefield.  Another
meaning  of  the  word  staging involves  the  presentation  of  war  to  the  public.  Like
theater, war requires settings and players and the various media outlets portray these
elements in different ways. Are we witnessing liberation from a brutal dictator or the
hostile takeover of a sovereign country? The interpretation depends on which channel
we watch and on our ideological  assumptions.  The outcome of  the military contest
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between Saddam’s forces and the U.S-led coalition may have been obvious from the
start, but the control of the war’s narrative was not. Later in the war, as the search for
Saddam’s alleged WMD failed, stories about torture at Abu Ghraib emerged, and the
insurgency intensified, the U.S. government lost more control over the narrative. 
 
Dramatis Personae
8 Control  Room largely  follows  cinéma  vérité  conventions,  capturing  events  on  the  fly,
though  it  does  employ  some  montage  to  great  effect  in  rendering  the  director’s
answers to Rumsfeld’s charges against Al Jazeera. Though cinéma vérité does not stage
the events it captures, I argue in this section, following the work of Erving Goffman,
that  life  follows art  and that  we can understand the real-life  conflicts  captured by
Noujaim in dramatic terms. 
9 Control  Room is not obviously a drama, yet it has dramatic features. The three main
characters in the film—Al Jazeera senior producers Hassan Ibrahim and Sameer Khader,
and U.S. Central Command Press Officer Captain Josh Rushing—all media workers, are
engaged in a  dramatic  contest  of  representation,  and the stakes  of  the contest  are
enormous. Is the war justified? Is the U.S. presence in Iraq an act of liberation or a
hostile invasion? Is Al Jazeera a news station or a source of propaganda? Control Room
posits that the war is not justified, that the U.S. presence in Iraq is a hostile invasion
and  that  Al  Jazeera  is  a  source  of  news,  but  it  makes  its  arguments  through
demonstration,  dialogue,  and  editing  rather  than  through  on-screen  or  voice-over
narration. 
10 The characters in Control  Room are not actors,  and the action is  not scripted.  Yet a
drama perspective reveals how struggles for power and control that are played out in
real  life  owe  something  to  fictional  drama  and  vice-versa.  Bill  Nichols’  concept  of
“virtual performance” is useful here:
Virtual  performance  presents  the  logic  of  actual  performance  without  signs  of
conscious awareness that this presentation is an act . . . Virtual performance, or the
everyday presentation of self, derives from a culturally specific system of meanings
surrounding  facial  expressions,  changes  of  vocal  tone  or  pitch,  shifts  in  body
posture, gestures, and so on—those very elements that actors train themselves to
control at will.7 
11 The bridge between reality  and drama is  even stronger in the sociological  work of
Erving Goffman on character contests.8 Goffman argues that people judge the behaviors
of  others  in  real  life  using  the  same  standards  by  which  they  judge  characters  in
fictional drama. Thus real life actors construct and/or frame dramatic encounters to
showcase the character traits they wish their audience to attribute to them. 
12 A special type of character contest, called a run-in, occurs when two characters want
opposing outcomes and neither character backs down. Goffman states that run-ins are
played for a number of stakes: to gain attributes of “good character” (such as courage,
honesty,  fidelity,  etc.)  by  acting  out  those  attributes;  to  maintain  self-control;  to
establish and maintain boundaries; to define the self at the expense of others; and to
decide who gets  to  have their  way.  Additionally,  such contests  can have numerous
outcomes:  an  overmatched  player  can  lose  a  contest  but  win  character  through
bravery, grace, or irony; a well-matched but honorable player can win character by
losing a run-in to an opponent who stoops to dirty tactics;  and a player who wins
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against a weaker opponent may lose character by acquiring the traits of a bully. The
determination of who “wins” a character contest belongs to the audience, who judges
not only the manifest outcome, but also the respective strengths and weaknesses of the
agonistes and the fairness of the tactics they use. 
13 At the risk of accepting the argument that corporations and government entities are
people, I argue that Al Jazeera and CentCom were agonistes in a character contest over
the representation of the war in Iraq. During wartime, mass media corporations and
government agencies have the means to affect the audience’s picture of the military
and ideological struggle. By shaping the narrative, such as by censoring information
about the tactics of one side or by overestimating the strengths of the other, these
entities  can tip  the  audience  and thus  the  outcome of  the  military  and ideological
character  contests.  Since  many  U.S.  media  corporations  became  enmeshed  and
embedded with the Pentagon, Al Jazeera’s fight for an alternative view put it in direct
conflict with the Pentagon. 
14 Control Room portrays Al Jazeera as the overmatched player. We see Al Jazeera bravely
defend itself against unethical and far stronger opponents, while Donald Rumsfeld and
other  Pentagon  officials  use  censorship  and  lies  to  manipulate  the  media  picture.
Rumsfeld,  in  turn,  openly  accuses  Al  Jazeera  of  lying,  broadcasting  anti-American
propaganda, and violating proper journalistic conventions against showing prisoners
and casualties. 
15 Though war may appear to be a contest in which there are no rules other than brute
force,  our  understanding  of  war  is  highly  structured  according  to the  dramatic
principles outlined by Goffman. The Bush administration sold the Iraq war to the public
primarily as a war of self-defense against Saddam Hussein’s WMD and his supposed ties
to Al  Qaeda,  and to a  lesser  extent as  a  war of  liberation against  a  tyrant bent on
creating an empire in the region. Throughout much of the world outside the U.S., these
justifications for war were met with near total rejection. Clearly, however, the Bush
administration succeeded in  launching the  war  because  its  false  justifications  were
accepted to  a  large  extent  by  U.S.  media  and thereafter  by  much of  the  American
public.9 Al Jazeera’s Ibrahim states, however, that he has absolute faith in both the U.S.
Constitution  and  the  American  people  to  correct  the  flawed  policies  of  the  Bush
administration.
16 Self-defense was the rhetorical glue that held American public opinion together on the
eve of the war. As Al Jazeera senior producer Sameer Khader opines in Control Room,
“The American media were hijacked by some people within the administration . . . to
make the Americans always feel that they are under siege and there is a threat and this
threat was represented by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.” A war of self-defense is easy to
justify and we can understand the nature of its appeal by describing it in the terms
Goffman provides. Self-defense implies the defender is of good character, especially if
the effort is to defend other weaker members of the group.10 It implies the defender has
maintained  self-control  and  has  only  struck  back  as  a  last  resort  in  the  face  of
imminent attack.  A war of  self-defense seeks to establish and maintain boundaries,
such as those boundaries protecting security and law, against an enemy that would
subvert them. It can define the self at the expense of others, which works extremely
well if you can portray the others as evil and yourself as good. And clearly, a war of self-
defense  can  determine  who  gets  to  have  their  way.  While  Control  Room does  not
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explicitly discredit each of the Bush administration’s claims to self-defense, it clearly 
does not accept them either. 
17 The Bush administration’s argument that the war in Iraq was in self-defense was never
very strong:  Saddam had never attacked the U.S.;  there was no proof he possessed
either weapons of mass destruction or had any ties to al Qaeda; and his military had
been greatly  degraded by  the  previous  Gulf  War,  years  of  sanctions,  and a  strictly
enforced  no-fly  zone.  Nevertheless,  much  of  the  American  public,  as  a  result  of
propaganda, came to believe Saddam was a threat to them. Other documentaries, such
as Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911, deconstruct Bush’s pro-war arguments, but Control
Room presents a more ground-level view of the media war.
18 Al  Jazeera  entered  the  media  agora, and  by  doing  so,  it  offered  viewpoints  that
contrasted with those of most American corporate media outlets. The American media,
with few exceptions, had fallen in line behind the Bush administration by cheerleading
the war and self-censoring. The battle for public opinion engaged by Al Jazeera was
fought largely over the question of media conventions. Al Jazeera showed dead and
grieving civilians, dead U.S. troops, and captured U.S. prisoners of war. American TV
rarely showed these images, but why? Did the U.S. government control the American
media?11 
19 Control  Room  uses  archive  footage  to  deconstruct  the  Bush  administration’s  and
Pentagon officials’ war discourses; they blamed Al Jazeera for using dirty tactics, and
thus fighting unfairly in the war of representation. A key issue in Control Room is Al
Jazeera’s portrayal of civilian casualties. Rumsfeld states that Arab television showed
things  that  are  “flat  not  true”12 in  order  to  incite  against  the  Americans.  Khader
counters Rumsfeld by pointing to a picture of a wounded child on Al Jazeera, “Rumsfeld
called this incitement. I call it true journalism.” 
20 Another key issue discussed in Control Room is whether Al Jazeera was wrong to have
shown footage of captured American POWs, which was videotaped by Iraqi officials. In
the film, we see George W. Bush exiting his helicopter, preceded by his dog, then his
wife  Laura.  Bush  answers  reporters’  questions  about  U.S.  prisoners.  Bush  says  he
“expects them to be treated humanely, and uh just like we’re treating the prisoners
that we have captured humanely.”13 We then see a video of a U.S. prisoner. An off-
screen person with an Arabic accent asks, “Why did you come from America?” “Because
I was told to come here.” “You come to kill Iraqi people?” “No. I come to fix broke
stuff.” 
21 Al Jazeera senior producer Hassan Ibrahim says, “Rumsfeld is saying that parading the
footage of these captives is a violation of the Geneva Convention.” He adds, “What do
you  call  Guantanamo  Bay,  what  you  call the  Iraqi  soldiers  parading  yesterday  on
American television, what do you call bombing a city without authorization from the
UN Security Council?” Noujaim cuts to Joanne Tucker, a manager of Al Jazeera, being
interviewed by an American journalist, who tells her there is a lot of pressure on Al
Jazeera to withdraw images showing captured U.S. troops. Tucker argues for showing
the footage, stating this “is not a clean war.” Asked if Al Jazeera is capable of being
objective, she replies, “Are any U.S. journalists objective about this war?” Tucker points
out that Al Jazeera was criticized for showing images of captured and dead U.S. troops,
but “if there were true neutrality, all information from all sides would be welcomed.” 
22 Next Noujaim cuts to CentCom’s Captain Rushing who takes up the other side of the
debate by stating that the images of dead U.S. soldiers on Al Jazeera, which Noujaim
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shows while he speaks, made him sick and that U.S. news does not show those kinds of
images. Yet Rushing adds that the images of wounded Iraqis he saw the following night
on Al Jazeera, which Noujaim also shows while he speaks, did not bother him as much,
and that  he  is  able  to  imagine  himself  in  the  shoes  of  Al  Jazeera  staff  having  the
opposite  reactions.  In  a  moment  of  profound  self-realization,  he  admits  of  his
partisanship, “It makes me hate war.” 
23 Compared to Captain Rushing, a model of reasonableness and self-awareness,14 Donald
Rumsfeld appears to be little more than a two-dimensional villain from a Hollywood
melodrama. One difference between a scripted melodrama and reality is that in Control
Room there is no poetic justice in which the wicked are punished. “We are dealing with
people who are willing to lie  to the world to make their  case,”  Rumsfeld says.  Yet
Rumsfeld remains unpunished for lying about Iraqi WMD and for ordering the abusive
treatment  of  prisoners  at  Abu  Ghraib,  Guantanamo,  and  other  sites.  Instead,  he
continues to justify his case for war. 
24 Control Room repeatedly emphasizes how small Al Jazeera is compared to the might of
the U.S. military.15 It sets up its audience to “root for the little guy.” The Al Jazeera staff
members are hardworking and ordinary. They are overweight, balding, chain smoking,
unglamorous. They seem particularly vulnerable as well. The beginning of Control Room
foreshadows the death of Tarek Ayyoub many times. We see reporters donning their
new “working gear”: flak vests and helmets. Mohamed Jasem, general manager of Al
Jazeera, tells us that the station gave their locations in major Iraqi cities to Washington
and to the Pentagon.  Noujaim cuts to shots of  bombs falling.  We see an Al  Jazeera
reporter on the roof of a building. Explosions occur behind him. He ducks. The camera
pulls back; we realize the image is on a television screen. We see a radio operator in Al
Jazeera’s office yelling “Baghdad? Baghdad?” into his microphone. We hear no answer.
This moment occurred at the beginning of the U.S. bombardment, but it was not the
day  Tarek  Ayyoub  died. Control  Room dramatizes  the  work  of  journalists  in  a  war
environment, thus framing them as heroes too.
25 The character conflict within Control Room reaches its crisis at the moment of Ayyoub’s
death. A crisis is  the point when the drama’s protagonists,  in this case Al Jazeera’s
Khader and CentCom’s Rushing, face their greatest challenges. Khader makes clear he
sees the attack as the Bush administration’s message to the station that it was being
targeted because it is “not one hundred percent against Saddam.”16 But Khader is not
deterred.  He  says  of  the  killing  of  Ayyoub,  “For  me it  was a  crime that  should  be
avenged, or at least investigated.” A press release from the U.S. states that coalition
forces came under significant heavy fire from the Al Jazeera building,  but the time
leading up to the attack was caught on video. No weapons fire from the building is
apparent. We see a plane turn and fly toward the building and unleash its payload.
Control Room uses visual proof, where available, to stand up against verbal arguments.
26 CentCom’s Captain Rushing faces a crisis too at this point. He denies that the American
bombing that killed Tarek Ayyoub was aimed at silencing Al Jazeera. He states that if
the U.S. had wanted to shut down any media coverage, the army could have done it.
Rushing also doubts the message was to turn the media down because the end result of
the bombing was to turn it up. Yet an Al Jazeera staffer, commenting later, states that
potential interview subjects said they would not speak to him after the attack, fearing
they  will  be  targeted.17 Control  Room,  through  discourse  and  editing,  reveals  the
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competition over the interpretation of events: a struggle of power over the framing of
the news. 
27 Captain  Rushing  is  an  appealing  figure  because  of  his  apparent  sincerity  and  his
dawning realization that  the war is  a  tragedy.  Noujaim treats  him sympathetically,
focusing on his  attractive face in close up.  Regardless  of  the true motives of  Bush,
Cheney,  and Rumsfeld,  Rushing seems to  have believed sincerely  that  the  U.S.  was
liberating Iraq and that the collision of the two worlds—Arab and American—could be
turned towards their mutual interests. During the course of the film, he comes to see
that the war has only spawned more hatred and mistrust. Rushing’s hamartia, a Greek
term applied to the error in judgment leading to the downfall of the tragic hero, does
not lead Rushing himself to suffer a calamitous downfall.18 Nevertheless, Rushing’s goal
—to convince the Arab people that the U.S. is their ally—collapses. The death of Tarek
Ayyoub  is  a  reversal  (peripitea)  that  signals  the  end  of  this  possibility,  at  least  to
Rushing. By the end of the film, Rushing recognizes (anagnorisis: the movement from
ignorance to knowledge) that he has not learned enough about Arabs. Rushing claims,
“We  [Americans]  don’t  want  to  occupy  Baghdad.”  Ibrahim  counters,  “you  are.”  In
response, Rushing says if he gets out of the Marines, he wants to do something with the
Palestinian issue. Ibrahim invites Rushing to dinner, signifying Control Room’s appeal for
ongoing dialogue across cultures.
 
Representation as War (or War as Representation)
28 At its core, war is a means of settling a disagreement, whether that dispute focuses on
boundaries,  values,  or power. If  one group of people is strong enough to physically
defeat their opponents,  they win the war,  though their viewpoint may not win the
battle for representation. 
29 Twentieth-century philosopher Michel Foucault inverted Clausewitz’s phrase “War is
politics  by other  means” to  “Politics  is  the continuation of  war by other  means.”19
Foucault confronts us with the ways in which arguments, politics, and war are almost
inextricably intertwined. Since philosophers present different ideas about the proper
form of argumentation, there is no essential or eternal reason why argument and war
must  be  intertwined.  Yet  the existence of  a  real  war  brings  out  the most  eristic  of
arguments. As Al Jazeera’s Sameer Khader says at the beginning of Control Room, “You
cannot wage a war without rumors, without media, without propaganda.”
30 In Control Room we perceive a clear metaphor between the war itself and the war of
representation—the  higher  the  perceived  stakes  go,  the  more  fierce  the  battle  for
representation and rhetorical dominance becomes. The line between rhetorical eristics
and military action is porous indeed. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson theorize that
language is metaphorically structured and that our concept of argument is structured
in terms of war:
It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We
can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an
opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground.
We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and
take  a  new line  of  attack.  Many of  the  things  we  do in  arguing  are  practically
structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle,  there is a
verbal battle,  and the structure of an argument––attack, defense,  counterattack,
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etc.––reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT AS WAR metaphor is one
that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.20
31 If we think about arguments as a form of war, we can see that different kinds of war
lead to different kinds of arguments. For instance, a war might be thought of as a type
of game in which a player wins one time but the opponent might win the next. Or war
might be imagined as a way to force others to submit to one’s will. Finally, war can be
imagined as a way to annihilate opponents––like the Punic wars of antiquity, or Hitler’s
wars. Depending upon which metaphor of war is invoked, a different form of argument
develops  as  a  result.  The  Bush  administration  and  its  allies  seemed  to  shift  their
definition of war as the conflict  escalated.  To maintain the fiction that its  war was
about liberation, it had to appear to care about the Iraqi people, yet it also declared its
intentions to “take the gloves off,” a thinly-veiled threat to use unrestrained violence,
it endorsed torture, and it declared free-fire zones in which soldiers were ordered to
kill anything that moved.
32 When Rumsfeld criticizes Al Jazeera for showing Iraqi civilians injured in U.S. bombing
attacks, Hassan Ibrahim, a senior producer of Al Jazeera and one of the three main
characters of Control Room, points to the hypocrisy of American rhetoric about the war.
“You are the most powerful nation on earth, I agree. You can defeat everybody, I agree.
You can crush everyone,  I  agree.  But don’t  ask us to love it  as  well!”  Captain Josh
Rushing of CentCom tries to defend against charges that the war is aimed at the Iraqi
population by arguing that the U.S. purchased precision bombs at 100 times the cost of
conventional bombs in order to minimize civilian casualties. Ibrahim responds, “You’re
still killing civilians, my friend . . . Since Vietnam, the picture has changed. And now in
the Arab world, of course, we’ve come to discover the wonders of television much later
than the rest  of  the world.  .  .  .  The idea of  another Arab capital  occupied is  really
fueling anger.” Rushing appears speechless. 
33 Despite their disagreements, Rushing and Ibrahim engage in dialogue with each other,
and  Rushing  seems  to  change  his  beliefs  when  challenged.  Warlike  arguments,  by
contrast, seldom encourage other people to hear one’s point of view. While there is
clearly a proper role for warlike arguments in news and documentary,21 there should
also  be  space  for  dialogue  as  well. Dialogue  makes  argumentation  a  supportive
communicative  endeavor.  Rather  than  thinking  of  arguments  as  wars  in  which  we
“attack”  our  opponents,  causing  them  to  “dig  in,”  “retrench,”  and  “put  up  their
defenses,” we could think of argumentation as a form of cooperative teaching, in which
we  employ  such  ethical  forms  of  persuasion  as  modeling,  reflecting,  and  giving
feedback. Such cooperative efforts occur many times among the characters featured in
Control  Room.  Noujaim  films  the  dialogues  of  Al  Jazeera  personnel  involved  in  the
making  of  the  news,  she  films  dialogues  among  opponents  such  as  Ibrahim  and
Rushing,  and she  captures  dialogues  that  occur  via  a  single  character,  such as  the
moment when Rushing notices his own bias regarding American casualties versus Iraqi
casualties.  Noujaim is trying to persuade her audience that dialogue is possible and
desirable  during  war.  Such  dialogue,  however,  requires  a  safe  space  and  willing
participants.  Ironically,  Control  Room opens a  space for  dialogue in the heart  of  the
media agora during a war.
34 In ancient Greece, public arguments occurred in the agora, or marketplace. The agora
ostensibly provided a forum for argumentation and the rational exchange of ideas that
shifted  the  means  of  battle  from  armed  conflict  to  verbal  conflict,  but  Plato  was
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suspicious of the argumentation in the agora because the winners were often Sophists
who knew how to win by distorting the truth.22 Plato wanted to take discourse out of
the brutal marketplace of ideas and create spaces of dialogue in which interlocutors
traded souls, or at least traded one another’s viewpoints.23 For Plato, debate should be
structured as a dialogue among allies who share a common quest for the truth, not as a
winner-take-all war.24 Al Jazeera is a news organization, not a philosophy club, and thus
does not abide by Plato’s ideal. Khader is keen for Al Jazeera to stick to the facts—in one
scene he berates a staffer for putting an anti-American diatribe on the air. Control Room,
however, is far more philosophical, showing us scenes in which the participants ask
each other to trade views, as when Ibrahim reminds Rushing to think about how Arabs
view images of civilian casualties. 
35 Though  Control  Room  captures  the  reality  of  the  journalist  as  agon,  the  film  itself
promotes  an  ethos  not  of  eristics, but  of  dialogue.  It  presents a  model  of  public
deliberation grounded in reasonableness and balance in opposition to bellicose and
extreme  rhetoric.  Muafak  Tawfik,  a  translator  for  Al  Jazeera,  seems  to  speak  for
Noujaim when he says ruefully that the war is radicalizing people: “There’ll be no more
room  for  people  like  me  who  speak  softly  and  rationally.”  The  greatest  irony  of
Noujaim’s film is that the model of thoughtful public discourse she champions—carried
on  by  the  film’s  trio  of  central  characters,  Al  Jazeera’s  Ibrahim  and  Khader  and
CentCom’s Rushing—occurs in private, off the air. Without Noujaim’s film we would not
have learned of their ambivalences, their doubts, and their struggles to make sense of
the  catastrophe  unfolding  around  them.  If  these  characters  had broadcast  their
ambivalences over the airwaves, their comments might have cost them their jobs. In
other words, dialogue still flickers during wartime, but usually off the air. In the arena
of public opinion, dialogue has little to no room during war. 
36 As an independent film, Control Room can reach an audience that seeks an alternative to
the bellicose rhetoric  of  the mainstream media agora.  Noujaim’s effort  to bring the
thoughtful private deliberations of Ibrahim, Khader, and Rushing to the public seems
worthy. In the face of tremendous propaganda and abuses from Bush’s neoconservative
cabal,  Middle  Eastern  autocrats,  and  Islamic  extremists,  thoughtful  deliberation  is
practically lost. Such discourse is too quiet to be heard above the shouting, the noise,
and the violence, and those who most need to hear it—those caught up in the narratives
of  Manichean  struggle—are  the  least likely  to  hear  it.  Additionally,  our  journalism
apparatus  does  not  support  such  dialogue,  but  instead  encourages  flag  waving,
shouting and polarization. 
37  Makers of war documentaries face numerous choices. Among these is the decision to
favor  either  eristics  or  dialogue  in  their  presentation.  Each  has  its  strengths  and
weaknesses.  Noujaim’s  film  promotes  dialogue  as  an  attractive  alternative  to
propaganda. Yet thoughtful deliberation may take too long during times of crisis and it
is too quiet to cut through the noise of the propaganda machines. Other documentary
films  about  the  Iraq  war,  such  as  Fahrenheit  911,  WMD:  Weapons  of  Mass  Deception, 
Hijacking Catastrophe: 9/11, Fear & the Selling of American Empire, The War You Don’t See, and
Uncovered:  The War on Iraq try to do just  that.  They take strong advocacy positions,
making arguments against the war that they intend to win. They marshal evidence,
experts, powerful rhetorical skills, and compelling sights and sounds to cut through the
noise and to address the many catastrophes—in government and in the media—that
both led to the war and followed from it. 
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38 Those hoping to promote a global democratic public sphere might desire a referee who
could ensure fair play in the media agora, but that ideal seems remote. Also remote is
the possibility for a dialogic space to emerge in the midst of the agora, though Control
Room’s Ibrahim and Rushing show that it is possible. Until we have a viable alternative
media universe, refereeing the existing media players and promoting dialogue may be
our next best hopes. And until that goal is met, fighting eristics with eristics––fire with
fire––is, regrettably, the most effective option remaining to us.
 
War Documentary and the Public Sphere
39 Most  documentarians  making films about  the Iraq War seem driven by a  desire  to
improve the public  sphere by offering information and perspectives  censored from
corporate and government controlled media outlets.  These filmmakers promote the
values of transparency, of public participation, and of reasonableness. They are often
shocked and angry at the scenes they witness, yet many maintain an ethos of fairness
and reasonableness.  Despite  their  best  efforts  to  protect,  enhance,  and expand the
public  sphere,  the  obstacles  facing  makers  of  independent  war  documentaries  are
substantial. Not only do they have trouble gaining access to information,25 they also
face great physical danger, political risks,26 and trouble finding distribution. In some
ways, independent documentary filmmakers are similar to Al Jazeera, which appears as
a scrappy startup with an alternative point of view, many obstacles to overcome, and a
desire to find an audience.
40 Al Jazeera’s struggles to create an alternative media perspective reveal a paradox in our
system of modern journalism: we need a mediated frame to understand modern war
but it is almost inevitable that those who create such frames will wind up inside them,
further complicating the picture. The emergence of this paradox is due, in part, to the
global 24-hour news and entertainment apparatus that has arisen with the advent of
satellite broadcasting and the Internet. As a result of this apparatus, media consumers
are now able to access multiple films, multiple channels, and multiple viewpoints. The
war of images occurs in real time. Each film and each channel can now re-frame the
other’s perspective as it provides its own frame for the narrative of the war. No one
stands above the fray. Today’s postmodern media environment stands in stark contrast
to the media environment that existed during World War I, in which images and stories
traveled more slowly and there were fewer of them competing in the same arena. In
recent  years,  the  battle  for  control  of  the  media  frame  has  become  increasingly
complicated,  setting  up  its  players—the  documentarians,  program  directors,
journalists, and military spokespeople—in a new arena in which they must consider
themselves both as raisoneurs (commentators) and as agonists, caught in the stories they
try to make. 
41  Critics such as Paul Arthur27 and Rand Richards Cooper28 argue that documentary films
which employ authorial voice and establish historical context, such as Michael Moore’s
Fahrenheit 911, are more relevant than cinéma vérité films like Control Room. For instance,
Control Room does little to contextualize the events it portrays.29 Arthur writes: 
We receive scant instruction on [Al Jazeera’s] previous history, the size of its staff,
number of bureaus, sources of funding, daily programming schedule, to say nothing
of the role of religion in editorial and content decisions, the status of women, and
so on. Indeed, even processes by which stories are assigned, gathered, edited, and
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produced  are  beyond Control  Room’s  narrow  scope.  Nor  are  we  privy  to  the
institutional  structure  or  divisions  of  labor  at  CentCom.  The  lack  of  such
information signals a disinterest in precisely the sort of contextual description that
can lead to informed, ‘big picture’ judgments.30
42 Control  Room  provides  limited  information  about  how CentCom tries  to  control  the
narrative of the war by manipulating a mostly compliant press, but without a broader
context, this information might make little sense to viewers. How much explanation is
necessary in a documentary? Bill Nichols cites Bertolt Brecht on this question:
Bertolt  Brecht  pointed  to  one  kind  of  excess  particularly  pertinent  to  the
documentary text when he argued that a photograph of the Krupp munition works
does nothing to explain the reality of that enterprise: its forced labor practices, its
margin of profit, its ties to the Nazi regime, and so on. Explanation, like narrative,
takes time.31
43 Excess—the context that exceeds the frame—is a major factor in our reading of Control
Room, which appeals mainly to an audience that already knows something about the
war and about the media. As an avid media consumer, I had already seen at least a
dozen  documentaries  about  the  Iraq  War  and  the  political  machinations  and
propaganda campaign leading up to it, had read several books about it, and had read
hundreds  of  articles  about  it  before  I  watched  Control  Room.  Without  background
knowledge, an audience viewing Control Room would be less likely to make sense of the
war, of the crisis within journalism, or of the need for urgent political action. I found
Control  Room compelling because it  showed me things I  didn’t know; it  revealed the
complex lives and choices faced by the media players in the center of the battle for
representation. Because it is an on-the-fly cinéma vérité-style film, Control Room uses the
power of surprise, often lacking in more didactic films, because we see events unfold
and people react to them in the moment.
44 I agree with Arthur that Control Room lacks the framing to contextualize many of the
events  it  portrays.  As  Arthur points  out,  Al  Jazeera and CentCom may hire  “truth-
seeking” individuals, but this fact tells us almost nothing about the organizations, and
without a “more detailed political-economic framework,” we are left to make only the
most facile  of  inferences about these organizations.  Additionally,  Cooper notes that
Control Room champions fairness, but with an air of futility. This air of futility is most
clearly  represented  by  Sameer  Khader’s  frequent  shrugs  and  his  jaded
pronouncements, such as “There is one single thing that will be left: victory, and that’s
it. People like victory. You don’t have to justify it. Once you are victorious, that’s it.”
Khader’s fatalism does little to encourage its audience to engage in political action.
45 By  contrast,  Fahrenheit  911,  timed  strategically  to  ambush  Bush’s  2004  re-election
campaign, entertains no doubts either about the wrongness of Bush’s actions or about
the need for political action, such as voting him out of office, to reverse Bush’s agenda.
Released in hundreds of theaters across the U.S., Fahrenheit 911 garnered massive media
coverage and had at least some hope of influencing events in the short term. By these
criteria, Control Room was a failure. 
46 Perhaps the proper way to view Control Room is to perceive it not as an urgent call to
promote dialogue and fairness during the immediate crisis of war, aims that may have
been hopeless in any case once the war started, but as a course correction over the long
term; once this war is over, the film suggests, individuals, organizations, and nations
should strive to engage in more dialogue and to be more fair. However, the film also
implies  that  we  just  need  a  few  more  thoughtful  individuals,  rather  than  more
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democratic  institutions,  to  make  this  change.  Though  I  agree  that  we  need  more
thoughtful  individuals  and  believe  that  Noujaim’s  film  makes  an  important
contribution towards this  effort,  I  believe documentary can and should do more to
bring about  a  long-term course correction.  Documentary can and should support  a
global  democratic  public  sphere.  It  can and should examine institutions,  and when
necessary, call for their reform. But the means to instituting such a deliberative public
sphere might require both dialogue and eristics.
47 In  order  to  magnify  the  didactic  power of  his  documentaries,  a  filmmaker  such as
Michael Moore,  who owes much to John Grierson,32 tends to use many of the same
tactics  as  the  propagandists  he  opposes.  Though  Moore  does  not  share  Grierson’s
allegiance to the state, he does tell his audience what to think about and how to think
about it.  As Cooper notes, Moore, in battling the Bush administration’s propaganda,
“fights fire with fire.”33 Noujaim, by contrast, focuses primarily on the conflicts faced
by her characters rather than on arguments. In letting viewers decide what to think,
she sacrifices most of the director’s didactic power. At their extremes, the didactic/
advocacy tradition undermines the democratic values it purports to nurture, while the
cinéma  vérité tradition  is  more  democratic  in  terms  of  its  means  but  may  be  less
effective in the face of propaganda. Of course, it is too easy to posit a false dichotomy
here. There are filmmakers who work across both traditions. 
48 Noujaim comes closest to such a hybrid style when responding to Donald Rumsfeld,
who complains that Al Jazeera plays propaganda: “What they do is is when there’s a
bomb goes down, they grab some children and some women and pretend that the bomb
hit the women and the children.” Noujaim cuts away from Rumsfeld to show television
images of severely injured children, making Rumsfeld appear to lie.  Sameer Khader
replies,  “We wanted to  show that  any war has  a  human cost.”  Noujaim’s  sequence
implies a thesis and refutation, but without a formal argument. Instead, Control Room
stays mainly in the cinéma vérité tradition:
The chief virtue of Noujaim’s version, aside from the up-close-and-personal take on
three striking personalities, is its allegorical defense of a tradition of independent
documentary ostensibly free of government or corporate coercion. That is, if the
elaborated contrast  between putatively democratic  American network news and
state-sponsored  reporting  at  Al  Jazeera  is  shown  to  be  misguided  at  best,  and
possibly  inverted,  Noujaim’s  own  cinematic  method  and  implied  mode  of
circulation is validated internally not just as an alternative to the two disparate
media  systems  under  consideration  but  as  superior  to  them  in  freedom  of
expression, ability to elicit identification with its subjects, and in the liberal values
that undergird its creative process. In short, to the extent that CNN or Fox News fall
short of achieving the goal of true independence, and to the extent that Al Jazeera
struggles mightily to do the same, cinéma vérité as practiced by the likes of Noujaim
is proposed as redeeming the promise of an ecumenical, ‘un-controlled’ cinema.34
49 A documentary filmmaker, no matter which style he or she chooses, can encourage the
audience to raise productive questions or can work to diminish them. Control  Room,
perhaps  inadvertently,  does  the  latter  on  occasion.  For  instance,  American  media
during  the  Iraq  War  almost  never  showed  images  of  Iraqi  civilian  casualties,  of
American prisoners of war, or of American dead. Al Jazeera showed all of these things.
Control  Room might have raised questions about  American media policies,  how they
have changed, what forces were at work in changing them, and what the consequences
of  such  changes  have  been.  By  focusing  on  individual  characters  rather  than  on
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policies,  the  film steers  us  away from questions  about  these  institutions.35 Without
understanding the forces of history, audiences have little hope of changing them.
50 A global  democratic  public  sphere requires  a  theoria,  which was a  group of  trusted
witnesses  in  ancient  Greece  who provided  an  official  version  of  events  that  would
become  the  basis  of  public  deliberation.  The  collapse  of  journalistic  integrity  in
America—represented most  dramatically  by  New  York  Times reporter  Judith  Miller’s
bogus reporting about Iraq’s supposed WMD, which she basically transcribed from Dick
Cheney’s misinformation campaign—has made the need for a new theoria, one free of
state control but rigorous and uncompromising, all the more pressing.36 As new media
entities such as Al Jazeera enter the fray, they become part of the story themselves.
Documentary film can contextualize this battle for hegemony of representation, but
they  cannot  escape  it.  Moore’s  Fahrenheit  911 provided  some  context,  but  became
controversial when pro-war partisans attacked it. Unlike Fahrenheit 911, Control Room
remained relatively uncontroversial and did not become a major part of the story it
covered. Seen in conjunction with Moore’s film, as well as those by Greenwald, Schecter
and  others,  Control  Room  appears  as  part  of  a  movement  within  documentary  that
challenges  propaganda  and  points  in  the  direction  of  a  new  theoria and  a  more
democratic and more global public sphere. 
51 Viewers  also  have  a  role  to  play  in  creating  a  more  democratic  and  global  public
sphere.  Armed  with  an  ethical  sense,  some  training  in  rhetoric  and  poetics,  and
additional historical research into the relevant institutions, viewers should be better
able to navigate the competing media frames and narratives about both war and the
war of  representation.  A  more critical  media  audience will  demand a  more critical
media. 
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